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THE DEVELOPMENT OF CANADIAN LAW ON TRANS-
BORDER DATA FLOW
INTRODUCTION
The transfer of information across political and cultural bounda-
ries is a phenomenon which predates written language.' In today's
world of satellites and computers, however, this flow of information
has taken on added importance. The merger of previously dispa-
rate telecommunications and computer technologies has resulted in
an "information technology" which reduces vast quantities of in-
formation to computer data, transferring it to points on earth and
in space at remarkable speeds.2 Large amounts of computer data
now cross national boundaries. Transborder data flow (TDF) re-
sults from the transfer, storage, or processing of data in the form of
digitally encoded, computer-readable units of information in more
than one nation.' TDF has prompted many countries to initiate
studies and to enact legislation to control or impede TDF. Cana-
' J. CARROLL, THE PROBLEM OF TRANSNATIONAL DATA FLOW 201 (undated). The flow of
information is recognized as a vital element in the development of ideas and the evolution of
cultures. See generally McNEILL, THE RISE OF THE WEST (1963). Cf. ETHNIC GROUPS AND
BOUNDARIES (F. Barth ed. 1969) (field studies of various ethnic groups that illustrate how
boundaries persist despite transboundary flow of information and personnel).
' Pipe, National Policies, International Debates, 29 J. CoM. 114 (1979).
3 Novotny, Transborder Data Flow Regulation: Technical Issues of Legal Concern, 3
COMPUTER/L.J. 105, 107 (1982).
Information reduced to machine readable form is "data." This Note is purposely nar-
rowed to concerns over computer-to-computer transmissions rather than problems with
news and entertainment broadcasts or with other forms of telecommunications, i.e. voice
telephony, telex, facsimile, and video. To qualify as TDF the process must involve transmis-
sion, storage, and computer computation. The transmission can occur through the physical
transportation of a storage medium, by terrestrial line, or by satellite link. Id. at 106-07.
For symposia on TDF, see Transborder Data Flow: New Frontiers-or None?, 29 J. CoM.
113 (1979); Transborder Data Flow, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1980).
The International Bar Association held its first symposium on TDF in Toronto, Canada
on October 6-7, 1983. For a recent review of the issues concerning Western news media bias
and attempts to control electronic broadcasting and information dissemination through the
establishment of a New World Information Order, see Fitzmaurice, The New World Infor-
mation and Communication Order (NWICO): Is the International Programme for the De-
velopment of Communication (IPDC) the Answer?, 15 J. INT'L L. & POL. 953 (1983).
" Eger, Emerging Restrictions on Transnational Data Flows: Privacy Protection or Non-
Tariff Trade Barriers?, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1055 (1978). The Expert Group on
Transborder Data Flows of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Working Party on Information, Computer, and Communications Policy published a report
derived from a study by the Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law concluding
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dian studies have raised considerable anxiety over the possible ef-
fects of TDF, 5 but curiously Canadian legislation designed to regu-
late either the information industry or TDF remains scarce.
Since the development of Canadian law in this area is unsettled,"
practitioners should watch for the emergence of a regulatory
scheme affecting the free flow of information to and from Canada.
This Note will survey Canadian policies and regulations concerning
TDF; explore other Canadian regulatory models which could be ex-
tended to include TDF; and compare the regulatory systems of
other countries, assessing their compatibility with the objectives of
the Canadian legal system.
This Note will show that the Canadian response to perceived
problems of TDF has been deliberate and restrained, reflecting a
careful balance of exclusive regulatory policies and inclusive poli-
cies restraining regulation.7 The result of this balance is well
targeted legislation designed to protect Canadian industries that
are particularly vulnerable to TDF. The Note concludes with an
overview of methods by which the United States and Canada may
pursue a mutually beneficial agreement on TDF.
I. INTRODUCTION TO TDF
As various private and public entities-primarily private compa-
that existing international law inadequately addresses the major considerations emerging
from TDF. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Expert Group on
Transborder Data Flows, Legal Issues Related to Transborder Data Flows, OECD Doc.
DSTI/1CCP/81.9 (1981).
6 CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF TELECOMUNICATIONS FOR CANADIAN
SOVEREIGNTY, DEP'T OF COMMUNICATIONS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND CANADA (1978) [herein-
after cited as Clyne Report]. The Clyne Report is the result of the Canadian inquiry into
the far-reaching effects of the information technology starting with DEP'T OF COMMUNICA-
TIONS, INSTANT WORLD: A REPORT ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN CANADA (1971). A large part of
the Clyne Report seems to be derived from an earlier in-depth study, 2 CANADIAN COM-
PUTER/COMMUNICATIONS TASK FORCE, BRANCHING OUT, DEP'T OF COMMUNICATIONS (1972)
[hereinafter cited as BRANCHING OUT].
Canada is one of the first countries to make a comprehensive examination of the possible
effects of TDF and the information revolution. Canada is also one of the few countries that
have attempted to calculate the economic costs, such as opportunity loss, job loss, reduction
in job creation, and the eventual effect on balance of payments. All studies on TDF spon-
sored by the Canadian Government contain a disclaimer denying any direct relationship
between the study and government policy.
I Interview with unnamed officials of the Canadian embassy, cited in Feldman & Garcia,
National Regulation of Transborder Data Flows, 7 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 21
(1982).
1 For a complete overview of competing policies in TDF issues, see Novotny, Transborder
Data Flows and International Law: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 16 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 141 (1980).
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nies, state agencies, and international organizations-become more
dependent on international computer communications, they be-
come increasingly concerned over access to and control of informa-
tion that is both internal (collected by the entity and generated
within the entity) and external (collected from outside the entity).'
Various barriers to international information flow are emerging,
particularly in the area of computer-to-computer communications,
TDF.9 The impact of barriers to TDF is primarily economic, par-
ticularly when an industrialized state creates these barriers. 10 Bar-
riers to TDF produce negative economic effects because a large and
growing number of domestic and multinational enterprises require
an efficient and unimpeded flow of data in order to manage busi-
ness operations, expand markets, and deliver goods and services."
Information flow has always been a prerequisite to international
trade, but new information technology has revolutionized informa-
tion processing, removing earlier constraints of distance and trans-
mission costs in the development of international information net-
works. 12  Traditional services, particularly the information-
dependent services such as banking and transportation, have
quickly adapted the new information technology to their informa-
tion needs.'3 These services have become more efficient and com-
petitive with improved information gathering, processing, and
transmission. Sending data back to a centralized computer system
for processing produces economies of scale." Centralization allows
8 A Canadian observer identifies three activities that create TDF: 1) intracompany infor-
mation transfers, 2) international information transfers, and 3) transnational pursuit of in-
formation resources. Intracompany information transfers usually involve an exchange of in-
ternal administrative information, customer service, or a maintenance of records.
International information transfers occur when national governments cooperate in adminis-
trative or security matters. For instance, Canada and the United States regularly exchange
information on defense, taxation, and criminal activity. The transnational pursuit of infor-
mation resources usually involves the private sector when data processing can be performed
more cheaply abroad, vital information is available only abroad, or circumvention of na-
tional laws is sought. J. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 202.
' See HOUSE COMM. ON GOv'T OPERATIONS, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION FLOW: FORGING A
NEW FRAMEWORK, H.R. REP No. 1535, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as
HousE REPORT].
I Id. at 11.
" Id. at 23. But see Saur, Protection Without Protectionism, 29 J. CoM. 138 (1979) (Bra-
zilian official strongly defends barriers to TDF as essential for the survival of domestic
businesses).
Pipe, supra note 2, at 114.
" Arakaki, Telecommunications and Information Services, 5 Bus. AM. 11 (1982).
W. SHARPE, THE ECONOMICS OF CoMPUTERS 315 (1969). This is essentially a statement
of "Grosch's Law" wherein large production systems are economically favored over small.
19831
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quick and accurate use of daily global operating information. 5 Us-
ing unimpaired TDF, information-intensive services can operate
worldwide, competing more effectively with indigenous services. 6
International trade in goods also has become more efficient. A
But see Berman, A Note Against Centralized Staff, DATAMATION, May 1970, at 28, where
decentralization is arguably more beneficial.
18 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 24.
' One result is that service exports have become vital in the balance of trade and lead the
gross national product (GNP) index. In Canada services surpassed goods in 1974. STATISTICS
CANADA, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY (Aug. 1982). In the United States, services
have strengthened the dollar in a period of heavy deficits in goods; the service trade surplus
exceeded $40 billion in 1981. Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1982, at 54, col. 1. Domestically, the ser-
vice sector accounts for 65% of GNP and for 7 of every 10 jobs. HOUSE REPORT, supra note
9, at 26. Recently, the United States incurred a 5% decline in its share of the world service
market. Shelp, Removing the Barriers to Services Trade, 5 Bus. AM. 22 (1982).
Developing countries are particularly concerned about the ability of their indigenous in-
dustries to compete with transnational corporations armed with the new technologies. See
Suavant, Transborder Data Flows and the Developing Countries, 37 INr'L ORG. 359 (1983).
In general, information must be acquired at a cost, but, once acquired, it is a valuable asset
for those who can use it repeatedly. The value of information lies in its application toward
reducing uncertainty, thereby minimizing both monetary and nonmonetary costs. For mul-
tinational corporations, information in readily useable form is a capital asset and a transfer-
able commodity. Developing countries that could benefit from accumulated information
often have neither the capital to acquire it nor the technical skills to apply it. See generally
E. MACKAAY, ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAw 109-18 (1982).
Cost of search
Benefits of search
Mai --- ---- (Reduced uncertainty)
MaximumJ
difference
m---------
Amount of search
Diagram illustrating the relationship between the cost of obtaining information and the re-
sulting benefits. Source: Id. at 111. The United Nations Centre on Transnational Corpora-
tions is attempting to address these concerns. See Transnational Corporations and Trans-
border Data Flows: Programme of Work and Progress Report, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/1982/12
(1982).
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symbiotic relationship exists between goods and services;1 7 infor-
mation technology makes manufacturing and distribution support
services more efficient. In addition, many goods and services are
compatible; for example, in the computer industry itself hardware
and software services are often sold as complete units."' Informa-
tion processing, storage, and transmission has become an impor-
tant service industry in itself. The burgeoning "information indus-
try" is providing new jobs and increasing national income.19
This "information revolution" and TDF increase trade deficits in
countries which must import information services or which have a
domestic information industry too underdeveloped to promote ef-
fective international competition in their domestic service and
manufacturing industries.2 0
II. CANADIAN TDF
Although there are other controversies over information re-
sources that raise various non-economic issues, 21 the Canadian
Government immediately recognized TDF as an economic issue
that has both positive and negative effects on the information in-
dustry and on the Canadian economy as a whole.22 To participate
" See Krommenacker, Trade-Related Services and GATT, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 510
(1979).
'8 Id. See generally Robinson, A New Economic Alliance-Services and Manufacturing,
FINANCIER, Mar. 1981, at 43.
'9 Telecommunications and computer goods and services account for the largest single
share of United States exports after agricultural products. The world market for telecom-
munications and information services was in excess of $180 billion in 1980, with the United
States market accounting for 40% of that total. By 1990 the market could be as high as
$442 billion. Arakaki, supra note 13, at 11. Some commentators have labeled the phenome-
non an "emergence of a new international information-industrial complex." Symposium on
Transborder Data Flow: New Frontiers or None?, supra note 3, at 113.
20 Professor Carroll observes that data flows toward economic advantage. Conversely, out-
going TDF has four adverse effects: loss of job opportunities, less control over foreign corpo-
rations operating within the nation, inability of the national government to defend certain
rights of its citizens, and a diminished stature in the world community. Generally, data for
decision-making will flow toward more developed nations, and information reflecting subse-
quent decisions will flow back toward less developed countries. J. CARROLL, supra note 1, at
203-06. See also Saur, supra note 11.
"I One of Canada's major problems is recognition of a well-defined cultural identity.
There is concern over the extent of culturally biased information that reaches Canadians,
particularly through the radio and television media, and over erosion of this vulnerable
identity. Clyne Report, supra note 5, at 79-82.
"' An early government task force studying the problem of privacy concluded that TDF
raised more questions about business activity lost by Canada than about invasion of privacy.
See TASK FORCE ON PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS, PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS: A REPORT OF A TASK
FORCE (1972) [hereinafter cited as PRIVACY REPORTI.
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in the information revolution, Canada must develop the appropri-
ate legal framework. Therefore, Canadians have had to identify
those factors peculiar to Canada which impede or support this ef-
fort and the relationship of TDF to those factors. The Canadian
Government identified the negative factors as follows: foreign
owned corporations control the basic technology and most com-
puter and communications equipment is imported; the Canadian
market alone will produce an unsatisfactory return on investment;
the dynamics and economics of United States-based operations
with branches in Canada favor the adoption of United States ser-
vice packages or direct use of United States services; and research
and development in Canada is not sufficiently capitalized to pro-
vide a viable product base in either hardware or software.23
TDF can either exacerbate or eliminate these problems. If more
raw data leaves Canada for processing than enters the country, the
Canadian data processing industry suffers, resulting in a deficit
trade balance. However, if Canada attempts to restrict this situa-
tion by restricting the flow of outgoing data, it risks provoking re-
ciprocal restrictions by the countries sending data into Canada. A
free flow of data provides access to larger markets and a source for
the most recent developments in the information technologies."
Faced with such difficult choices, a Canadian Government study
concluded that computers and communications were already inte-
gral to the economic functioning of Canada and that TDF was es-
sential to the degree of efficiency required to maintain a competi-
tive position in both national and international markets.2 5 With
this recommendation in mind the Canadian Government has
sought to identify those interests which compel resort to a legal
response to TDF.
13 BRANCHING OuT, supra note 5, at 76-77. This does not necessarily mean that only the
most powerful countries get the data inflow. For instance, some United States firms find it
economically advantageous to have data processed in Canada; however, it is more often the
case that data flows toward centralized facilities south of Canada's border. In 1979 the cost
of operating a data bank in Canada was considerably higher than in the United States.
Canadian import duties and federal and provincial sales taxes were the primary causes. The
president of a Canadian-based data processing firm, which did three-quarters of its business
outside of Canada, estimated that the firm would save one million dollars annually in oper-
ating costs if it moved to the United States. Keddy, Transborder Data Flows: An Uncertain
Threat, 6 IN SAEACH 12, 16 (1979). Geographically it is more convenient for TDF from Van-
couver to flow to Seattle and back than to Toronto. J. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 203-05.
In an attempt to regulate or encumber information flows, countries run a grave risk of
endangering their economic and social health. Heintz, The Dangers of Regulation, 29 J.
COM. 129 (1979).
11 BRANCHING OuT, supra note 5, at 76.
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A. Canadian Law, Sovereignty Interests, and TDF.
Sovereignty interests or privacy interests usually warrant regula-
tory activity. Canadians describe the sovereignty issues in TDF as
"macro" and the privacy issues as "micro." ''" A study, commis-
sioned by the government and prepared by the Consultative Com-
mittee on the Implications of Telecommunications for Canadian
Sovereignty,27 defined the macro problems as dependence on for-
eign data banks, erosion of the Canadian cultural and national
identity, decreased control over domestic economic affairs, and a
rapid decline in Canada's ability to compete in international indus-
tries.2 8 The study, popularly known as the Clyne Report, con-
cluded that Canadian sovereignty depends on control over tele-
communications and TDF.2 9 The intensely nationalistic tone of the
Clyne Report caused considerable public reaction and obscured the
primary economic issues behind the generalized language of
"sovereignty."30
" Gotlieb & Katz, Work Paper on Issues Associated With the Transborder Flow of Per-
sonal Information, 9 L. & COMPUTER TECH. 2, 7 (1976).
'7 Clyne Report, supra note 5.
" Id. at 2. The Clyne Report analogized the development of the information technology
with the industrial revolution and invariably concluded that Canada must act to assure a
place in the resulting new international economic order. Id. at 58.
" Id. at 64. For a brief and readable overview of Canada's present national identity
problems, see Canada, 6 W.SON Q. 45 (1982). See also J. DICKEY, CANADA AND THE AME1-
CAN PRESENCE (1975).
The Clyne Report defined "sovereignty" as the "ability of Canadians... to exercise con-
trol over the direction of economic, social, cultural, and political change." Clyne Report,
supra note 5, at 1. Such a broad definition is inapplicable in an interdependent world; there-
fore, it is probably more accurate to define "sovereignty" as "the residuum of power which it
possesses within the confines laid down by international law." J. STARK, AN INTRODUCTION
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (1977). Regardless of the definition, some commentators accept
the notion that a state's control over information that reaches its citizens has long been a
prerequisite of national sovereignty. Bigelow, Transborder Data Flow Barriers, 20 JUR. J. 8
(1979). But see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/
810, at 71, art. 19 (1948) ("everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes freedom to impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers"). For a complete discussion of the international legal principles which support the
free flow of information, see Feldman, Commercial Speech, Transborder Data Flows and
the Right to Communicate Under International Law, 17 INT'L LAw. 87 (1983).
Other commentators feel that sovereignty is an "internationally respected shibboleth" for
creating barriers to TDF for strictly economic motives, thus making it difficult to clarify and
negotiate the core issues. See, e.g., Eger, The Global Phenomenon of Teleinformatics: An
Introduction, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203, 231 (1981).
" A later Canadian study approaches these problems of sovereignty as essentially eco-
nomic. COMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS BRANCH, DEP'T OF COMMUNICATIONS, THE INFORMATION
REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA (1980) [hereinafter cited as INFORMATION
REVOLUTION]. The emphasis on the economic realities of TDF is consistent with studies that
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The Clyne Report recommended the development of a Canadian
informatics policy.3 ' Informatics is a term used to describe the so-
cial, cultural, political, and economic implications of the new infor-
mation technology."2 The Clyne Report specifically recommended
vigorous promotion and development of domestic data banks and
high-technology telecommunications.3 It also urged immediate
regulation of TDF to ensure control over information vital to na-
tional sovereignty.' 4 Suggested measures included launching a na-
predate the Clyne Report. See BRANCHING OUT, supra note 5. It may be that the Clyne
Report contained a considerable amount of rhetoric.
" Clyne Report, supra note 5, at 84.
3' The Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics, which provides assistance to developing
countries in the application of information technology, defines "informatics" as "the ra-
tional and systematic application of information to economic, social, and political develop-
ment." Informatics: Its Political Impact, IBI Doc. DG 1-04, at 2 (1980). Other terms such as
"teleinformatics" are also used. Eger, supra note 29, at 203.
Clyne Report, supra note 5, at 84 (Recommendation 22).
Id. (Recommendation 24). The following chart categorizes the various strategies availa-
ble in transborder data flow regulation.
Instrument:
Ideological Diplomatic
Direct Regulation:
Mandatory disclosures
of information; import/
export controls on
data transmission;
surveillance or
interception of data
transfers; direct
stoppage of data
transfers;
cryptographic
concealment of
information; other
security measures;
establishment of
criminal penalties for
rule violations
Taxation of data or
users; tariffs on
extraterritorial
processing;
enforcement of
proprietary rights;
discriminatory pricing
for services; relaxation
of controls to attract
data users (data
havens)
Appeals to principles
of the free flow of
information,
informational
sovereignty, new world
information order,
privacy and fair
information practices,
human knowledge and
understanding through
communication
Agreements relating to
the free flow of
information and
restrictions upon it, or
agreements that
institutionalize other
strategies and goals.
Indirect Regulation:
Import/export Taxation, pricing, or Appeals to the benefits Technical agreements
restrictions on other economic or burdens of new and relating to computer
computer and controls on trade in advancing computer and communication
communication computer and communication technology;, agreements
equipment; use of communication technology, such as that facilitate the use
security controls; equipment; realization "telematics" of certain standards,
restrictions on the of economic benefits of equipment, or uses of
technology of new computer and available resources.
computer communication
communication technology; prohibition
on the use of new
technologies
Novotny, supra note 7, at 159.
Use of Force Economic
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tional awareness campaign, requiring performance of data process-
ing related to Canadian business operations in Canada, and
preventing foreign takeovers of Canadian data processing enter-
prises.385  None of these specific recommendations has yet
culminated in a law which affects TDF.
In the area of banking, a legal restriction designed to prevent the
exportation of raw data was already under consideration at the
time of the Clyne Report. The measure was incorporated into the
Banks and Banking Law Revision Act of 1980 (Bank Act), 36 mak-
ing it the only Canadian law directed specifically toward alleviating
some of the problems of sovereignty that emerge from increased
TDF.
The final version of the Bank Act requires banks to "maintain
and process in Canada any information or data relating to the
preparation and maintenance" of required banking records.3 7 The
Bank Act authorizes the Inspector of Banks to grant or withhold
permission to process copies or extracts of customer records
outside Canada.38 He may also curtail data processing outside Ca-
nada if he determines that such data processing undermines his
oversight responsibilities.3 9
This power of the Inspector of Banks to suspend extraterritorial
data processing of the banking records that are required under the
Bank Act is consistent with his duty to maintain the integrity of
the Canadian banking system.40 For the first time the Bank Act
allows foreign banks to charter subsidiaries in Canada;4 accord-
ingly, the law must provide a means for the Inspector of Banks to
be able to perform his oversight function over these banks. But the
Bank Act goes further by giving the Minister of Finance power to
advise the Inspector of Banks to suspend data processing outside
of Canada if the Minister concludes that it is in the national inter-
Id.
Banks and Banking Law Revision Act, 1980, ch. 40, 1979-1980 Can. Stat. 155 [hereinaf-
tar cited as Bank Act].
37 Id. § 157(1), (4).
- Id. § 157(6).
39 Id.
40 The federal government was probably trying to bring the foreign banking sector under
the federal regulatory framework by means of this power granted to the Inspector of Banks.
See Sinclair & Krossel, Foreign Banks, Competition and the Bank Act, 86 CANADIAN
BANK"R & ICF REV. 9 (1979).
"' Prior to the Bank Act, foreign banks operated as "near banks" incorporated and gov-
erned by provincial law and free from federal restrictions. Id. at 16.
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est to do so.4 If the Minister of Finance were to conclude that the
Canadian informatics policy is in the national interest, then this
power could allow the implementation of economic and political
strategies to further informatics goals which lie outside the mainte-
nance of banking integrity.4"
In light of the importance of TDF to the information-dependent
international banking industry," Canada's restrictions on TDF
through the Bank Act have strategic consequences. These restric-
tions encourage the use of Canadian-based data processing services
and control the dissemination of national economic data, consis-
tent with recommendations of the Clyne Report to lessen the im-
pact of TDF on national sovereignty." Specifically, with impaired
TDF, banking in Canada must rely on data processing performed
in Canada, thus promoting the domestic information industry, and
international banking organizations may be less able to compete
with the large Canadian banks.46 There are no indications that
these provisions of the Bank Act are being stringently applied, but
the Bank Act could inhibit bank-related TDF.
B. Canadian Law, Privacy Interests, and TDF.
The controversy over the effects of computers on individual pri-
" Bank Act, supra note 36, § 157(6).
4' Feldman & Garcia, supra note 6, at 23.
" See Housz REPOaT, supra note 9, at 24; see also International Communications Reor-
ganization Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 1957 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Gov't Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 337, 341, 377, 420 (1981) (letters of United States
banking officials) [hereinafter cited as Communications Hearings].
45 See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text. Recommendation 24(c) supported the
proposed Bank Act revisions and recommended that the same provisions be extended to the
insurance and loan industries. Clyne Report, supra note 5, at 84.
4 In Canada only a few large national banks dominate the domestic banking sector.
These banks are presently having difficulties because of overextended lending-to-capital ra-
tios after speculative lending in the Canadian oil industry. See Canada's Banks Take a
Beating, Bus. WK., Aug. 9, 1982, at 58. For a review of the Bank Act as protectionist legisla-
tion in favor of Canadian banks, see Note, The Canadian Banking Law Revision Act: Com-
petitive Stimulus or Protectionist Barrier?, 13 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 783 (1981).
Banks are extremely dependent on unrestricted TDF to manage operations and provide
efficient services. Barriers to TDF have a significant impact on international banking. The
Bank Act has been criticized by United States bankers as a blatant attempt to hamper
United States banking operations in Canada, but it is still uncertain how it will be applied.
One United States banker interprets the Bank Act as restricting TDF at the beginning of
the gathering process by allowing only refined or processed data to be sent out of the coun-
try; therefore raw data must be processed in Canada. This same banker reports that Cana-
dian officials told him before passage of the Bank Act to prepare to do all data processing in
Canada. See Communications Hearings, supra note 44, at 420 (letter of Robert Walker,
Vice President and Associate General Counsel to Continental Bank).
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vacy stems from apprehension over the growing ability of informa-
tion technology to store and disseminate vast quantities of data
concerning individuals.47 Today, comprehensive personal details
about almost everyone are stored in various public and private
data banks.48 The general view is that the information technology
which makes such extensive collection of data possible has created
concentrations of power and authority which threaten the rights
and freedoms of individuals to control information about them-
selves.49 Although there was little public concern in Canada over
this issue, the Canadian Government felt that it was time to study
the problem and the possibility of protective legislation.5 0 Rising
public concern in the United States over this issue prompted legis-
lation to protect individuals from possible abuse of personal data."1
The Canadian Departments of Communications and Justice es-
tablished a Task Force on Privacy and Computers. Background
studies for the Task Force concluded that TDF threatened the pri-
vacy of individual Canadians.52 Early empirical findings indicated
that a vast majority of the personally identifiable data leaving Ca-
nada went to data banks in the United States. 3 Canadian law did
not assure Canadian citizens access to or control over their per-
sonal data in the United States; the Task Force responded to this
problem with four proposals for domestic regulation of TDF.
The first proposal was to do nothing and to rely on United
States legislation to provide adequate protection for Canadians. 4
' A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971).
" See generally id.
'" D. WEISSTUB & C. GOTLIEB, THE NATURE OF PRIVACY: A STUDY OF THE PRIVACY AND
COMPUTER TASK FORCE 88 (undated).
" Id. at 3. The authors describe the Canadian privacy issue as a government response to
anxiety in other countries rather than to a Canadian grass-roots movement. Id.
"1 The United States laws are: Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976); Right
to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 1100-1122, 92 Stat. 3697 (codified
in scattered sections of 12 and 31 U.S.C.); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681
(1976); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1976); Tax
Reform Act of 1976, § 1202a, 26 U.S.C. § 6103.
" See C. DALFEN, INTERNATIONAL FACTORS: A REPORT OF THE PRIVACY AND CoMPUTER
TASK FORCE 26, 30 (undated). Problems of TDF and privacy were confronted by an earlier
conference which called for the creation of the Task Force. See CONFEENCE ON COMPUTMS:
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, Queen's University (May 21-24, 1970). The Task
Force concluded their studies with the PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 22.
" See C. DALFEN, supra note 52, at 3. The principal gatherers of data about Canadians
are credit card companies, loan companies, credit reporting companies, insurance compa-
nies, law enforcement agencies, tax agencies, labor unions, and the personnel departments of
multinational enterprises. Id.
" PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 22, at 171.
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This would have left Canada exposed to changes in the United
States laws and unable to impose its own privacy standards.55 The
second proposal was to allow outgoing TDF but to require entities
that store or transmit data outside Canada to register with a gov-
ernmental authority.5 The regulatory model proposed included
the creation of a monitoring agency.5 7 The agency was to make no
distinction between entities that use personally identifiable data
and those that have no data concerning individuals. This option
would have allowed Canada to gather more empirical data on the
extent and substance of all outgoing TDF, but the Task Force con-
sidered registration too administratively cumbersome.
The third proposal was to require duplicate data files of outgo-
ing data to be kept in Canada.58 Although this would have enabled
individuals to gain access to and to correct information on dupli-
cate files in Canada, it would not have diminished the possibility of
abuse in the United States. In addition, the Task Force considered
the duplicate file proposal even more cumbersome than the second
proposal.59 The fourth proposal was to curtail all outgoing TDF.e0
The Task Force objected to this extreme alternative on the bases
of principle and practicality."' In principle, any severe curtailment
of TDF would affect the flow of information essential to interna-
tional commerce, contrary to Canadian policies of free trade.' As a
practical matter, enforcement would be virtually impossible along
the common border of the two countries." The Task Force found
that these same objections also applied to fiscal or excise barriers
65 Id.
88 Id.
5' See J. SHARP, REGULATORY MoDELs: A STUDY OF THE PRIVACY AND COMPUTER TASK
FORCE 16-17 (undated); see also PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 22, at 159-60. The Task Force
generally felt that TDF should somehow be monitored and recorded and that the use of
data banks in Canada should be encouraged. Id. at 182-83. Compare id. with Novotny,
supra note 3 (discussing the prohibitive expense of monitoring).
PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 22, at 171.
9 Id.
so Id.
61 Id.
" Id. at 172. The background study warned against the use of privacy as a reason for
restricting TDF. C. DALFEN, supra note 52, at 27. The need to have unrestricted access to
world markets for Canada's extensive natural resource products encourages Canadian indus-
trial policies to support free trade. See generally Macdonald, Canadian Industrial Policy
Objectives and Article III of GATT: National Ambitions and International Obligations, 6
CAN. Bus. L.J. 385 (1982).
0' PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 22, at 172. The background study cited the many methods
of transporting and communicating information across the border as precluding any mean-
ingful enforcement. C. DALFEN, supra note 52, at 27. See also Novotny, supra note 3.
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to TDF, while such barriers would do nothing to enhance the pro-
tection of privacy.
64
No TDF regulation was based on a Task Force proposal to pro-
tect individual privacy; in fact, one study concluded that existing
United States laws provided better protection for Canadians than
nonexistent Canadian law.65 The option which called for the devel-
opment of a Canadian privacy law more restrictive than the United
States privacy laws raised fears of inadvertently creating a United
States "data haven" to which Canadian data operations would
move in order to avoid the limitations and costs of the Canadian
law.6 A "data haven" in the United States would severely under-
mine the development of a Canadian information industry; there-
fore, it was not unusual that subsequent legislation produced the
Canadian Human Rights Act, which closely resembles United
States privacy and fair information law.67 Although the Task Force
addressed itself to all data banks, the Human Rights Act is appli-
cable only to government data banks.66 In addition, the Human
Rights Act failed to adopt any of the regulatory models suggested
by the Task Force, but instead created an office of Privacy Com-
missioner to assist individuals in pursuing personal data inquiries
regarding information in government data banks.6 9 In its present
" PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 22, at 172.
" C. DALFEN, supra note 52, at 25.
"The term "data haven" has uncertain parentage. It appears to have been coined in
Europe to describe the erosion of a high national standard of data privacy by the transfer of
data into a country with a low standard of data privacy. See Hondius, Data Law in Europe,
16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 87, 102 (1980). Hondius derides the notion of data havens as unrealistic
in a world where the majority of countries have no data protection laws at all. Id. at 103.
Canada has itself been a data haven in limited circumstances. It gave "refuge" to a pro-
gram which allowed the American Council on Education to gather personally identifiable
data in the United States on drug abuse without the fear of possible subpoena by United
States courts. J. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 205.
67 Canadian Human Rights Act, 1977, ch. 33, 1976-1977 Can. Stat. 887 [hereinafter cited
as Human Rights Act]. For the United States laws, see supra note 51. The most noteworthy
common principles are the right of access to personal data and the right to correct erroneous
personal data.
In a thinly veiled reference to the United States, Professor Carroll concluded that be-
tween two countries in "close proximity and with similar legal systems and social environ-
ment" there were three judicious control mechanisms over TDF: harmonization of the two
sets of national laws, reciprocity agreements, and the establishment of minimal common
general principles. J. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 206.
" Human Rights Act, supra note 67, art. 50, para. 1. During the conference which created
the Task Force, a prominent Canadian computer expert, Prof. J.M. Sharp, suggested that
"every data bank should be subject to a licensing requirement," regardless of what entity
operates it. CONFERENCE ON CoMPuTERs, supra note 52, at 78.
" Human Rights Act, supra note 67, art. 57. The Commissioner has no enforcement pow-
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form the Human Rights Act does not affect TDF, although subse-
quent legislation could extend it to cover private sector data banks
and TDF. The Privacy Commissioner may conduct studies of the
feasibility of extending the principles of the Human Rights Act to
non-governmental institutions; 0 however, the Minister of Justice
must initiate such a study. 1
III. EXISTING CANADIAN MODELS OF REGULATING TDF
Even though the Canadian Government is concerned about the
macro and micro implications of TDF, only one Canadian law ap-
pears to be directed specifically at controlling TDF.7 However,
there are other Canadian laws and regulatory schemes designed to
obstruct other types of foreign economic and political intrusions.
These statutes may serve as models or be used for further regula-
tion of TDF.
A. Foreign Investment Review Act
The extent of foreign ownership of property and industry in a
country may raise national anxiety over the extent of foreign con-
trol of its natural resources and economic affairs. Studies by the
Canadian Government brought considerable public attention to
foreign ownership in Canada.73 As a result, the Foreign Investment
Review Act (the Act)7 4 was enacted to control the extent of foreign
investment in Canadian industry. Non-Canadians, non-resident
Canadians, or entities controlled directly or indirectly by such in-
vestors must apply to the Foreign Investment Review Agency
(FIRA) for permission to acquire control over assets or shares in
Canada and to invest in new endeavors in Canada.75 FIRA requires
era and is only authorized to investigate citizen complaints and to submit a report on its
findings. Id. arts. 58, 59.
Id. art. 61, para. 1.
7! Id. The Privacy Commissioner strongly supports the ombudsman approach and the
limitation on enforcement powers. CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER 1981, 120 (1982).
" See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
73 PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY
(1968) (Watkins Report); INFORMATION CANADA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA
(1972) [hereinafter cited as the Gray Report].
" Foreign Investment Review Act, 1973, ch. 46, 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 619. For a discus-
sion of the effects of the FIRA on free trade, see Carasco, The Foreign Investment Review
Agency (FIRA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Incompatible?,
13 GA. J. Ir'L & Comp. L. 441 (1983).
76 Foreign Investment Review Act, 1973, ch. 46, § 8, 1973-1974 Can. Stat. at 636.
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the investor to establish that the acquisition or investment will be
of significant benefit to Canada.
Although concern over foreign ownership was the impetus for
the Act, decisions of FIRA and ultimately of the Federal Cabinet
have indicated an increasing emphasis on inducing applicants to
use goods and services of Canadian origin." This could affect TDF
if applicants were required to use Canadian data processing and
data bank facilities as a prerequisite to FIRA approval.
The experiences of Apple Computer and of Comshare, both
United States corporations, show that the computer service indus-
try is under particular pressure from FIRA. Apple Computer nego-
tiated for ten months with FIRA and was granted approval to es-
tablish operations in Canada after making considerable concessions
to suit Canadian economic goals, including commitments to use
only Canadian goods and services, if available. 8 Comshare sought
FIRA approval of a plan to buy a controlling interest in CSL, Ltd.,
a Canadian computer company. 9 Comshare committed itself to
several future activities in favor of the Canadian information in-
dustry, including the promotion of Canadian data processing ser-
vices.80 Ultimately, Comshare's application was denied as not
meeting the "significant benefit to Canada" requirement.81 This
activity by FIRA is consistent with specific recommendations of
the Clyne Report to control foreign takeovers in the information
industry.82
Since the Act is being used in a manner which already has indi-
rect effects on TDF and the information industry, it may be erro-
neous to refer to the Act as simply a model for TDF regulation.
However, the structure of the Act may provide a direct method of
7 Id. § 2(2), at 620.
Macdonald, supra note 62, at 395.
78 Id. For the announcement of the approval by the Foreign Investment Review Agency,
see FIRA, Release No. F-180 (Sept. 27, 1981). For the view of the United States business
establishment, see Apple's 10-Month Tango With Canada Illustrates Investment Law's
Problems, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1981, at 30, col. 1. Apple also committed itself to promoting
Canadian peripherals that were compatible with the Apple product line. Id.
7' Communications Hearings, supra note 44, at 208.
o Id. at 234-47.
" Id. at 251.
Clyne Report, supra note 5, at 84. Recommendation 24(d) states that the government
should act to "prevent foreign takeovers" in the data processing industrty. Id. See supra
notes 33-35 and accompanying text. FIRA has been roundly criticized by Canadian legisla-
tors for not being effective in controlling foreign takeovers in the data processing field which
is 80% Canadian controlled, a statistic that some legislators do not want to see eroded.
COMMONs DEBATEs, 31st Parl., 1st Sess. 1904-08 (1979).
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assessing the relative benefits of proposed transborder data links
and of imposing conditions on data link establishment, such as a
requirement for a certain quantity of data flow to go into Canada
for processing and storage.
B. Business Records Protection Act
Nondisclosure laws are frequently enacted to promote domestic
industries.83 In Canada the Business Records Protection Act
(BRPA) 81 is a provincial law enacted in response to attempts by
the United States to extend its extraterritorial antitrust jurisdic-
tion. Demands by United States agencies and courts that defen-
dants in antitrust cases produce documents located in Canada in-
duced the Ontario legislature to enact BRPA.a5 BRPA prohibits
the production of any document requested by a foreign tribunal
unless such document is normally sent out of the province in the
regular course of business;86 BRPA thus constitutes a statutory
ban on the export of a specified class of information. It would not
be inconsistent with the purpose of BRPA to prohibit the flow of
business data to the United States for processing, particularly if
United States courts determined that they should have access to
all data in United States data banks. The potential for creation of
a Canadian federal authority that can review and determine the
content of TDF to the United States is evident in this type of
legislation.
C. The Combines Investigation Act
The government of a country which hosts branches or subsidiar-
ies of foreign-based multinationals may feel vulnerable when major
03 See Irish, Tax Havens, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449 (1982). For a more complete
discussion of the development of laws to promote internationally competitive financial ser-
vices, see B. EFYROS, EMERGING FINANCIAL CENTERS: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
(1982). Many countries have made their laws more stringent in response to United States
antitrust enforcement activities. In Britain, Parliament passed the Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11. For similar French legislation, see Law No. 80-538, 1980 J.O.
1799. See also Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Anti-
trust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979).
" Business Records Protection Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 56 (1980).
,5 Id. This legislation followed an order by a United States court requiring that Canadian
paper companies operated in New York produce documents located in Canada. In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed to Can. Int'l Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013
(S.D.N.Y. 1947). Another provincial law enacted for the same purpose is the Business Con-
cerns Records Act, QUE. REV. STAT. ch. D-12 (1977).
" Business Records Protection Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 56, § 1 (1980).
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operational decisions are made outside its territory which could
have far-reaching effects inside its territory.87 Most outgoing Cana-
dian TDF is generated by branches or subsidiaries of multination-
als based in the United States."8 The Canadian Government has
expressed concern over how much of this data contributes to deci-
sions which undermine its ability to control the Canadian economy
and to maintain a competitive market.89 Accordingly, the Canadian
Parliament considered amending Canadian antitrust legislation in
order to control this TDF.90
The proposed amendment to the Combines Investigation Act 9
had the same elements found in the Bank Act provisions discussed
above. The amendment would have required entities subject to the
Act to perform data processing in Canada or to store copies in Ca-
nada of all data authorized for extraterritorial processing. Ostensi-
bly, this amendment would ensure the oversight function of the
regulatory agency.
If enacted, this amendment would have had a considerable im-
pact on Canadian TDF. However, both this amendment and the
similar amendment to the Bank Act were rejected at the commit-
tee level in 1978.92 It is noteworthy that after the Clyne Report
appeared in 1979, the Bank Act amendment was submitted and
became law.98 It is conceivable that the amendment to the Com-
bines Investigation Act could be reconsidered as well, particularly
in a time of increasing economic protectionism. 94
" The French delegation to an Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics conference on
TDF said that TDF is "an index to and cause of the loss of power of States vis-&-vis mul-
tinational companies." Progress on the TDF Front, 26 DATAMATION 126 (1980). For a general
criticism of large multinational enterprises and their effects on host countries, see R. BAR-
NEr & R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH (1974).
" Peter Robinson of the Canadian Department of Communications asserted that 90% of
outgoing Canadian TDF is information going to corporate headquarters in the United
States. Progress on the TDF Front, supra note 87, at 126.
8 Robinson repeated Prof. Carroll's assertion that "[t]he country where the data are
processed and stored tends to be the location where the decisions are made." Id. See supra
note 20.
Ganley, Loosening the Telecom Link, 26 DATAmATiON 149 (1980).
01 Combines Investigation Act, CAN. Ray. STAT. ch. C-23 (1970).
" Ganley, supra note 90, at 150.
93 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
" Inflation, trade deficits, unemployment, and unsteady currencies have caused govern-
ments to resort to economic nationalism or protectionism. More familiar forms of protec-
tionism such as the use of quotas and high tariffs have been rendered mostly obsolete by the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. However, neoprotectionist barriers to trade
have emerged in unfamiliar and even deceptive forms. See Green, The New Protectionism,
1983]
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IV. A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF OTHER REGULATORY MODELS
Canada could adopt models for TDF regulation from any of the
many countries that are designing informatic strategies to better
accommodate and exploit the effects of the information revolu-
tion.95 Control over TDF is a vital element of these strategies. Con-
trol is obtained through three regulatory mechanisms: data protec-
tion laws, telecommunications regulations, and absolute barriers.
Each regulatory mechanism is evaluted below as to its usefulness
in the Canadian context.
A. Data Protection
The philosophy of most of the West European legislation con-
cerning TDF is that in order to best protect the individual, the
state must protect the personal data relating to him, thus the term
"data protection."" Privacy does not play a dominant role; the
3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1 (1981). There are over 2,000 anticompetitive barriers which serve
to protect domestic businesses from foreign competition, particularly in service industries.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. GOVERNMENT INVENTORY OF SELECTED IM-
PEDIMENTS TO TRADE IN SERVICES (1981).
96 Only a few countries other than Canada have actually begun to design policies dealing
specifically with nonpersonal data flows; these countries are France, Japan, Sweden, and
Brazil. Sauvant, supra note 16, at 370.
" See Hondius, supra note 66. Generally West European data protection laws have simi-
lar characteristics; all are designed to protect the information rather than to provide a case-
by-case determination oriented toward protecting the individual as in the United States.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 38-40. See generally F. HONDIUS, EMERGING DATA PROTEC-
TION IN EUROPE (1975).
For a slightly outdated list of data protection laws, see OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
U.S. DE"T OF COMMERCE, SPEC. Pus. No. 78-19, SELECTED FOREIGN NATIONAL DATA PROTEC-
TION LAWS AND BILLS (1978). The following is a current list of national laws which are di-
rected toward computers and privacy issues. Austria: Data Protection Act, No. 565, 1978
Bundesgesetzblatt for die Republik 6sterreich [BGBI$O] 3619, reprinted in 5 COMPUTER L.
SERV., app. 9-5.2a, No. 8 [hereinafter cited as Austrian Data Protection Act]. Denmark: Pri-
vate Registers etc. Act, No. 293, 1978 Lovitdende for Kongeriget Danmark [LKDk] A 833,
reprinted in 5 COMPUTER L. SEav., app. 9-5.2a, No. 6 [hereinafter cited as Danish Public
Registers Act]. France: Act 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, Concerning Data Processing, Files, and
Liberties, 1978 Journal Ofliciel de la Rbpublique Francaise [J.O.] 227, 1978 Recueil Dalloz-
Sirey, Legislation [D.S.L.] 77, reprinted in 5 COMPUTER L. SERV., app. 9-5.2a, No. 4 [herein-
after cited as French Data Processing Act]; Act 78-22 of Jan. 10, 1978, Concerning Access by
and Protection of Consumers in the Area of Certain Credit Operations, 1978 J.O. 299, 1978
D.S.L. 84. Luxembourg: Law Governing the Use of Name-Linked Data in Data Processing,
Document Parlementaire No. 2131 (1979). Norway: Personal Data Registers Act, No. 48
(June 9, 1978), reprinted in 5 COMPUTER L. SERv., app. 9-5.2a, No. 5 [hereinafter cited as
Norwegian Privacy Act 1978]. Sweden: Data Act, No. 289, 1973 Svensk Forfattnings
Samling [SFS] 518, as amended by Act of June 12, 1979, No. 334, 1979 SFS 727, reprinted
in 5 COMPUTER L. SERv., app. 9-5.2a, No. 2 [hereinafter cited as Swedish Data Act). West
Germany: Federal Data Protection Act, 1977 Bundesgesetzblatt I 201, reprinted in 5 CoM-
842
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word "privacy" is not even mentioned in these laws.97 Data protec-
tion laws regulate private as well as public data banks.
1. Common Data Protection
The structure of French data protection law is illustrative of Eu-
ropean legislation. Most European legislation provides for a regu-
latory agency. In France the regulatory agency is the National
Data Processing and Liberties Commission (Data Commission).
Any entity that wishes to collect, process, store, or transmit data
must register with the Data Commission." At the time of filing, an
applicant must indicate whether its activity will involve any TDF;
if the activity does involve TDF, the Data Commission has author-
ity to curtail the activity or refuse to grant approval.100 One distin-
guishing feature of the French law is the criminalization of mana-
gerial decision-making about individuals based solely on computer
information. 10 This provision is limited by jurisdictional consider-
ations, but it could conceivably be used to prohibit further TDF
between a French branch of a foreign-based multinational and its
headquarters.
Proponents have touted European data protection legislation as
a "rare example of a branch of law concerned almost solely with a
moral issue."102 The protection of principles of privacy is an admi-
rable impetus for legislation, but the creation of an administrative
body with significant power to apply and interpret the regulations
exposes the moral issue to significant erosion by economic and po-
litical forces. The French have significant economic interests at
stake and have been outspoken in their intention to control
French-related TDF in order to protect these interests.1 0 3 They
PUTER L. SERV., app. 9-5.2a, No. 3 [hereinafter cited as West German Data Protection Act].
97 Hondius, supra note 66, at 95. This is attributed to different notions of privacy in
Europe. Privacy has generally evaded definition, but excluding others from interference in
one's personal affairs is not an important issue in the modern European welfare state. Id.
" French Data Processing Act, supra note 96.
" Id. art. 15.
100 Id. art. 19.
Id. art. 2. According to Louis Joinet of the French Ministry of Justice, this is the
"beginning of legislation on social profiles." A United States commentator sees this legisla-
tion as an "attack on automation per se" rather than an improvement in personal privacy
protection. Grossman, Transborder Data Flow: Separating the Privacy Interests of Individ-
uals and Corporations, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 25 (1982).
It is estimated that about 5% of total TDF involves personal data. Sauvant, supra note
16, at 370.
1o2 Hondius, supra note 66, at 110.
'"3 "Information is power and economic information is economic power." Statement by
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have developed a t01matique plan which stresses the use of vari-
ous selective barriers to gain advantages over the United States in
the information market.'0 4 In a period of rising protectionism, the
French could use the Data Commission to implement selective bar-
riers to TDF pursuant to their t01matique plan.10 5
Louis Joinet, O.E.C.D. Symposium on Transborder Data Flows and the Protection of Pri-
vacy, Vienna, Sept. 20-23, 1977. See also Joinet, Les Aspects Juridiques, Economiques et
Sociaux des Flux Transfrontires de Donies Personnelles, 1 INFORMATION, COMPUTER AND
COMM. POL'v 208 (1979). Even in the use of language the French are precise as to the eco-
nomic consequences of TDF, preferring the term "international information commerce"
over "transborder data flows" to more accurately reflect the employment and balance of
payments effects. Lemoine, Article, in CII-HoNvwma. BUL, SvssMEs D'INFoRMATIQUE
(May 1979), quoted in Pipe, supra note 2, at 119. The French have also argued that uncon-
trolled TDF threatens to decay the nation-state by making it subordinate to multinational
organizations and enterprises. Madec, Economic and Legal Aspects of Transborder Data
Flows, O.E.C.D. Doc.. DSTI/ICCP/80.26, 33, 37 (1980).
10 S. NORA & A. MINc, L'IORMATIZATION DR LA Socs-tt (1978), translated in S. NoRA &
A. MINc, THE COPUTmZATION OF SOCIETY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENr OF FRANCE (1980)
[hereinafter cited as NORA-MINc REPORT]. "T6lmatique" is the term coined by the French
to describe the convergence of the communications and computer technologies. A tklama-
tique plan would be the equivalent of an informatics strategy. For an inquiry into the vari-
ous selected barriers suggested by the French study, see Strathe-McClure, French Telecom-
munications: Digital Technology and the Tkilmatique Program, ELECmONIC NEWS &
SCIENrIFIc AMER CAN (Supp. 1980).
An understanding of the French and West European data processing markets reveals the
basic economic issues involved in the development of informatic strategies and of laws tai-
lored to promote these strategies. Europe is a battleground for the control of information
markets. Thirteen United States firms are among the top 25 competitors. Of these, IBM
dominates the market with the largest single share of 34.8%. The European Community
(EC) is concerned over the future of Europe's own computer industry and has threatened
IBM with antitrust litigation. Ironically, IBM has 13 plants in six countries in the EC that
produce 95% of the products sold there, and IBM is among the top 10 taxpayers in Europe.
West European firms have succeeded in controlling 60% of their own market; it is not coin-
cidental that France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy represent 66% of the
total data processing market in Europe. Each of these countries has a major domestic com-
puter and data processing company which receives preferential treatment by its govern-
ment; respectively these are CII-Honeywell Bull, Siemens, ICL, and Olivette. See Tracking
Europe's Top 25, 27 DATAmATION 36 (1981); Going Global, 26 DATAMATION 130 (1980); IBM's
Other Antitrust Battle, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1982, at N23, col. 3.
I" Europe's overall economic position has begun to decline, and various EC member
states have recognized the need to offset declines in traditional industries while moving into
the evolving information industry. See supra note 94. The EC's success in the information
industry hinges on control by member states of their respective markets; presently Europe
supplies only 16% of the world market compared to 70% provided by the United States.
There are substantial fears that the EC will be unable to take advantage of its collective
economies of scale because of inefficient and non-uniform telecommunications and the pro-
tectionism of individual members. See Commission of the European Communities, Euro-
pean Society Faced With the Challenge of New Information Technologies, Doc. COM(79)
650 final (1979) (the Dublin Report). For an article describing the teleinformatic strategy of
the Commission of the European Communities, see Ramsey, Europe Responds to the Chal-
lenge of the New Information Technologies: A Teleinformatics Strategy for the 1980's, 14
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The closest approximation to data protection law in Canada is
the Canadian Human Rights Act, which arises from a fundamen-
tally different legal philosophy. 10 6 Common law countries tradition-
ally view legislation as necessary only if a demonstrable mischief
exists which customary law or judicial case law cannot remedy.10 7
The contrast in legal philosophies is manifested in the differing
types of enforcement mechanisms designed to reduce data abuse.
Canadian control over data abuse is both internal and external. In-
ternally, ultimate "in-house" supervision is conferred on the minis-
ters of the Crown. Externally, control is subjective; the data sub-
ject must initiate any controlling activity. In contrast, European
data protection law establishes an external objective rather than
subjective controlling mechanism; a tribunal or board regulates all
data processing and initiates enforcement activities. 108 The role of
the Canadian Privacy Commissioner is somewhat analogous to that
of a European data protection agency, but the Privacy Commis-
sioner has a limited ombudsman duty and no enforcement powers
equivalent to those of a European data protection agency. 0 '
Canadian concerns over the privacy of personal data mainly
emerged from the potential of governmental abuse,110 making it
doubtful that the Canadian Human Rights Act would be expanded
to give a government bureaucracy as much power as a European
data protection board. It is suggested that the concept of data pro-
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 237 (1981). In principle, the Council of Europe supports the protection
of privacy in transborder flows of personal data; however, it condemns the use of data pro-
tection laws for other purposes. See Council of Europe: Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, art. 12, 24
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 246) 31 (1981), Europ. T.S. No. 108, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 317
(1981); Council of Europe: Declaration on the Freedom of Expression and Information, Apr.
29, 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 667 (1982). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) also recognizes the need to have unimpeded TDF and avoid the
abuse of data protection legislation. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(80) 58 (final) (1980), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422 (1981).
oo See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
Hondius, supra note 66, at 97.
'" House REPORT, supra note 9, at 40; Burkert, Institutions of Data Protection-An At-
tempt at a Functional Explanation of European National Data Protection Laws, 3 CoM-
PuTER/L.J. 167, 183 (1982); F. HONDIUS, supra note 96, at 101.
See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
o M. BROWN, B. BILLINGSLEY, & R. SHAMAI, PRIVACY AND PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 34
(Research Pub. 15, prepared for the Commission on Freedom of Information and Individual
Privacy, 1980) [hereinafter cited as M. BROWN]; but cf. D. WlEISSTU & C. GOTLIEB, supra
note 49, at 3 (asserting that the Canadian Government was merely responding to the anxiety
in other countries).
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tection is so fundamentally different from the privacy concepts
embodied in the Canadian Human Rights Act that the Act would
not be a major vehicle for the codification of the European data
protection concept. It should be noted that regulatory models simi-
lar to data protection were suggested by the Canadian privacy
studies. 1 ' The major factors cited in rejecting the European model
of regulation were problems with enforcement and particularly
fears of allowing the emergence of a United States "data haven,"
because less restrictive United States laws would induce the pri-
vate data processing industry to leave Canada."'
2. Corporate Data Protection
There is presently a growing trend in Europe to include corpora-
tions, trade unions, and other organizations as protected entities
under data protection laws. 1 3 This has been done in Denmark.
Danish law" 4 created a Data Surveillance Authority with explicit
authority to approve or disapprove the transmission of data to any
point outside Denmark." 5 The authority can ban all TDF to any
country that it determines is deficient in protective legislation." 6
Under this law corporations theoretically have access to data
concerning their operations that may be contained in the data
banks of a competing corporation." 7 This type of legislation has
been condemned by some commentators as blatantly anticompeti-
tive and designed solely to aid domestic industries." 8
It is difficult to envision the adoption of this model by Canada.
The Canadian approach to privacy has developed with the rights
of individuals as a dominant concern. The interests of corporations
See supra notes 57 and 62 and accompanying text.
u Id. The Task Force concurred in the opinion that the principal problem was not one of
privacy. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 22, at 171.
113 See Grossman, supra note 101. The West European statutes, which include legal per-
sons, were passed in Austria, Denmark, Norway, and Luxembourg. See supra note 96. The
French data protection bill originally extended to legal persons but that provision was de-
feated by a strong pro-business lobby. Interview with Louis Joinet, Member of the French
Commission on Liberties, Files and Data Processing, in Paris (Dec. 19, 1978), quoted in M.
BROWN, supra note 110, at 133.
"1 Danish Private Registers Act, supra note 96, part 1, § 1.
Id. § 3(2).
16 Id. § 21(2).
:17 Grossman, supra note 101, at 3.
118 "Any semblance of an attempt to protect individual privacy vanishes and is replaced
by a government mandate to forage among private corporate data bases under the rubric of
protecting other corporation's privacy. This is not privacy protection but rather a heavy
handed form of commercial regulation." Id. at 26.
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are purely economic and incompatible with the same values that
give rise to protecting individual privacy. 1 9 In addition, present
Canadian privacy law gives the right of access only to federal data
systems, thereby negating the threat of one corporation having ac-
cess to the data banks of another.'
One commentator suggests that the potential for the emergence
of a Canadian corporate privacy statute can be found in the recom-
mendations of the Task Force on Privacy and Computers.' 2 ' How-
ever, to adopt such a statute, the Canadian Government would
have to overcome not only substantial differences in legal philoso-
phy but also in economic policy. This type of statute would cause
multinationals to keep their important data outside the country
and could induce many Canadian companies to do likewise.12
B. Telecommunications Regulations
Many industrialized nations have developed telecommunications
regulations which impede TDF.'23 Unlike data protection legisla-
tion, these regulations purposely impede commerce without the
pretense of protection of privacy. 24 Most of these regulations are
promulgated by state-owned communications monopolies, Postal
Telephone and Telegraph authorities (PTTs), which regulate com-
mon carriage to and from other countries either through terrestrial
line, transoceanic cable, or by satellite. 25 PTTs can impose a vari-
ety of restrictive requirements on the use of their telecommunica-
tions networks for TDF, ranging from excessive rates"2 to disap-
" For an analysis of the values which gave rise to notions of individual privacy, see id. at
12-18.
310 See Human Rights Act, supra note 67.
122 Grossman, supra note 101, at 29. Grossman points to the proposal that a duplicate set
of data files be maintained in Canada. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
'1 See Markoski, Telecommunications Regulations as Barriers to the Transborder Flow
of Information, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 287 (1981); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 12-15.
Markoski, supra note 123, at 288; Bus. WK., Aug. 3, 1981, at 10.
" "Common carriage" refers to two-way communications services. In the United States
the regulatory authority is the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Communica-
tions Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (Supp. III 1979). Unlike the FCC, PTTs provide the
services and related equipment in addition to regulating use. Many of the PTTs have con-
siderable economic and political power. See Ramsey, supra note 105, at 262-64.
"' The cost of using many telecommunications networks in Europe is two to five times
higher than in the United States, and often there are particularly high rates charged for
interconnections between PTTs. Recently, PTTs have been trying to switch from fixed-cost
dedicated lines to usage-sensitive lines which will be considerably more expensive. See
HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 13; Markoski, supra note 123, at 298-301.
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proval of equipment interfaces." 7
As both the regulator and the regulated, a PTT has the author-
ity to further its own interests and to subrogate the interests of
others. 128 For example, in Japan, the providers of the domestic and
international telecommunications services are two separate enti-
ties, but both are subject to a central authority.12 9 The domestic
telecommunications provider is also the largest supplier of data
processing services in Japan,130 so it is probably no accident that
the international provider has imposed procedural regulations and
contractual conditions making it difficult for foreign suppliers of
data processing services to lease outgoing communications lines.31
Presently, the European PTTs appear to be acting in concert to
exclude non-European TDF.13 2 Purposefully or not, tactics such as
these have made it either too costly or technically difficult to pro-
mote TDF.
The use of telecommunications regulations in Canada to impede
TDF has been considered above. The Clyne Report suggests the
use of telecommunications systems design standards that will facil-
itate the adoption of Canadian technology while limiting use of
foreign technology. 133 In one instance, regulating authority was
used to deny a point-to-point satellite link between a data base in
127 PTTs will often have technical standards or equipment leasing requirements which
must be met in order to connect a computer to the telecommunications network. See House
REPORT, supra note 9, at 14-15. One company solved its problems with PTTs by transmit-
ting the data to a house on one side of the border where it was recorded on a reel of tape,
then an employee walked across the border with the tape and transmitted the data to its
final destination. Going Global, supra note 104, at 136.
In Canada, as in the United States, the attachment of subscriber-provided terminal
equipment is permitted. Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission
(CRTC) Decision No. 80-13 (Aug. 5, 1980); see Markoski, supra note 123, at 291 n.14.
128 Markoski, supra note 123, at 295.
129 The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications oversees Kokusai Denshin Denwa
(KDD), a private company that provides international services, and Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone, the domestic carrier. Id. at 294 n.29.
180 Id.
131 Control Data and Tymshare, two such data processing suppliers, have been restricted
severely by the terms of their contractual arrangements with KDD; in addition, KDD sub-
jected the applicant's software and hardware to such a detailed inspection that there was a
suspicion that KDD was trying to acquire technology through the use of the inspection pro-
cedures. See International Data Flow: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Gov't Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 63 (1980) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings].
132 This system, known as EURONET, costs $5 per hour for computer use by EC mem-
bers and $20 to $30 per hour for access by non-EC members. Id. at 63; see also Communica-
tions Hearings, supra note 44, at 137-49.
133 Clyne Report, supra note 5, at 73.
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the United States and a customer in Vancouver.'8 4
In spite of these examples, it is suggested that Canada will not
use telecommunications regulations to control TDF. Both the na-
ture of the telecommunications network and the nature of the legal
structure which regulates the network make it difficult, if not im-
possible, for Canada to implement significant regulatory impedi-
ments. The Canadian telecommunications system is very dissimilar
from a PTT. In Canada there are numerous private organizations
providing telecommunications services and related equipment reg-
ulated on a carrier-by-carrier basis by several administrative agen-
cies at both the provincial and federal level. 3 5 No single agency
has sole jurisdiction over international rates. The agency asserting
jurisdiction will usually negotiate with its foreign counterpart.' In
addition to the difficulty of formulating regulatory schemes, the
Canadian federal power to legislate and regulate in the area of
telecommunications is not entirely unquestioned. The jurisdiction
to review the uses of specific point-to-point connections is limited
and confusing.' 7
11" Canadian authorities denied the Vancouver real estate board permission to use the
multiple listing services of a United States based subsidiary of McGraw-Hill, Inc. See
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 17; House Hearings, supra note 131, at 671. When Satellite
Business Systems, a United States corporation, applied to the FCC for permission to link its
transmission service to several large Canadian cities, there was a motion put forth in the
House of Commons to ensure that Canadian authorities would not grant permission if the
FCC granted permission. The motion did not pass and eventually Canadian authorities and
the FCC reached agreement on the matter. COMMONS DEBATES, 32d Parl., 2d Sess. 6909
(1981).
There is concern over financial losses that Canada could incur if United States business in
Canada used direct satellite communications to bypass the Canadian telecommunications
system. 0. GANLEY, THE UNITED STATES-CANADIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION RE-
SOURCES RELATIONSHIP AND ITS PossmI SIGNIFICANCE FOR WORLDWIDE DIPLOMACY 15 (Pro-
gram on Information Resources Policy No. P-80-2, 1980).
' BRANCHING OUT, supra note 5, at 6. Clyne Report, supra note 5, at 23.
""Clyne Report, supra note 5, at 9.
137 Id. Early government studies revealed a confusing tangle of applicable statutes includ-
ing: The Radio Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. R-1 (1970); The Railway Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch.
R-2 (1970); The Telegraphs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. T-3 (1970); The Telesat Canada Act,
CAN. REV. STAT. ch. T-4 (1970); The Broadcasting Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. B-11 (1970); The
Canada Shipping Act, CAN REV. STAT. ch. S-9 (1970); The Canadian Overseas Telecommuni-
cations Corporation Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-11 (1970); The Department of Communica-
tions Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-24 (1970); in addition to assorted provincial telecommuni-
cations acts. Although it is clear that an information service sending data across the
Canadian border is under federal jurisdiction, it is not clear which statutes are applicable
and which agencies have jurisdiction. See generally DEP'T OF COMMUNICATIONS, AN ANALYSIS
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASIS FOR THE REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN
CANADA (1971); F. JORDAN, PRIVACY, COMPUTER DATA BANKS COMMUNICATIONS AND THE CON-
STITUTION: A STUDY BY THE PRIVACY AND COMPUTER TASK FORCE (undated); R. BUCHAN, C.
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The regulatory framework itself may not prevent the implemen-
tation of restrictions, but the numerous open telecommunications
circuits connecting Canada and the United States make it virtually
impossible to stop data flow across the border.1"8
C. Absolute Barriers
Brazilian informatics strategy is simple. Brazil bars all computer
products and data processing importation in those markets which
domestic information industries are able to service.139 Information
is perceived as a "natural" resource which multinationals are try-
ing to exploit.140 It has been argued that if foreign multinationals
corner the information markets in developing nations, these na-
tions will effectively be excluded from the emerging economic or-
der which is based on information. The issue centers on the threat
of economic dependence of developing nations on the developed
nations.1 41 In order to avoid this scenario the Brazilian Govern-
ment has created regulatory authorities that exercise absolute con-
JOHNSTON, T. KANE, B. LESSER, R. SCHULTZ, & W. STANBURY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULA-
TIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1982).
Conflicts between the federal and provincial governments slow the development of a co-
herent policy and reflect conflicting interests in the establishment of economic links with
the United States. INFORMATION REVOLUTION, supra note 30, at 89.
108 CONFERENCE ON COMPUTERS, supra note 52, at 88.
'" HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 31. See also Vidal, Brazil Declares Computer Inde-
pendence, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1978, at F3; Bortnick, International Information Flow: The
Developing World Perspective, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 333, 340 (1981); Saur, supra note 11;
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Transborder Data Flows and Brazil,
U.N. Doec. ST/CTC/40 (1983).
140 See United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corpora-
tions and Transborder Data Flows: A Technical Paper, U.N. Doec. ST/CTC/23 (1982). Devel-
oping countries are seeking to reverse this situation by encouraging the exploitation of TDF
by themselves. See United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Transborder
Data Flows: Access to the International On-line Data-base Market, U.N. Doec. ST/CTC/41
(1983).
141 Saur, supra note 11, at 138. Saur, then Executive Secretary for CAPRE, the Brazilian
Informatics Coordinating Committee, wrote that the key is "to develop a local capacity for
computer power, to confine data within borders, and to provide protection for those local
development efforts." Id. Saur believes that without these barriers to free data flow it would
be impossible for developing nations to compete at an equitable level with the developed
nations. It has been estimated that without CAPRE regulation, imports in 1978 would have
exceeded 300 million dollars. Bortnick, supra note 139, at 341 n.50.
Brazil's computer market is the world's eighth largest, with sales of $780 million in 1981.
Domestic restrictions on computers and related services have driven costs up while enabling
Brazil to be largely self-reliant in the small computer field. The five largest producers of
computers in that country reported extensive losses in 1981 as a result of the uncompetitive
costs of their computers. See Brazil's Ban on Small Computers, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1982, at
26(e), col. 3.
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trol over TDF by regulating the equipment that can be imported
and by requiring registration and approval of current and potential
TDF.142
Unlike Brazil, information-poor developing countries lack a suffi-
cient internal market to develop a domestic information industry;
therefore, they are at various stages of securing access to and con-
trol over data collected inside or transmitted across their
borders.1 43
Canada does not seem to fit the category of a developing country
rich or deficient in information, but Canadian rhetoric in interna-
tional discussions on TDF has been compared to that of develop-
ing countries. 44 This is probably because the Canadians and the
developing countries share similar concerns over cultural domina-
tion and issues of economic dependence versus interdependence.1 45
The potential for an absolute barrier to outgoing TDF in order
to protect a nascent Canadian information industry is minimal at
best. The Canadian information industry is already sufficiently de-
veloped to service the Canadian market, particularly at the
microcomputer level. That market, however, is too limited for an
adequate return on investment,"' so the Canadian information in-
dustry has had to be increasingly competitive in world markets.14 7
An absolute barrier raises the specter of reciprocal action on the
part of other countries which may have important markets for the
Canadians.1 48 In addition, the inflow of the latest information tech-
nologies which accompanies TDF is vital for the development of
the Canadian information industry. ' 9 Thus, until the Canadians
M" Brazilian Executive Decree No. 84.067 (Oct. 8, 1979). For a detailed discussion of the
regulatory framework of CAPRE, see United Nations Centre on Transrational Corpora-
tions, supra note 139. See also Bortnick, supra note 139, at 340. For a discussion of the
problems these regulations cause in the industry, see Going Global, supra note 104.
'4 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 31; Pipe, supra note 2.
4' "The Canadians spoke almost as Third Worlders at the 2nd World Computing Ser-
vices Congress. . . ." Going Global, supra note 104, at 133.
'" See Grossman, supra note 101, at 18.
146 BRANCHING OUT, supra note 5, at 76.
147 "Two or three of the largest" Canadian data processing companies exported from 10 to
20% of their services to the United States alone. Ganley, supra note 90, at 150. For a review
of the extent of the Canadian data processing industry's activities abroad, see 27 DATAMA-
TION 40 (1981).
,'4 Canada has,been very interested in promoting Canadian-owned two-way television
technology in North America. See CAN. DEP'T OF COMMUNICATIONS, TELIDON (1979). For a
discussion of the use of reciprocity in response to barriers to TDF, see Markoski, supra note
123, at 320.
'" It is estimated that the invisible inflow of United States technology into Canada in
1976 was between $600 and $700 millon. INFORMATION REVOLUTION, supra note 30, at 70.
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are able to provide their own research and development, they will
have to continue to depend on TDF in order to stay competitive in
this rapidly changing industry.60
V. CANADIAN/UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIP AND TDF
Almost all Canadian TDF originates or terminates in the United
States, 8 ' so although Canada is actively promoting multilateral
O See supra notes 87-89. Canadian subsidiaries of foreign companies are often depen-
dent on parent companies for research and development and attendant technologies. This
results in a relatively low level of research and development performed by foreign-controlled
businesses in Canada.
$ millions
Total
revenues
Company Name Ownership 1980
1. IBM Canada Ltd. U.S. 1,506.0
2. Northern Telecom Ltd. Can. 2,055.0
3. Digital Equipment of Canada Ltd. U.S. 163.7
4. Control Data Canada Ltd. U.S. 162.6
5. NCR Canada Ltd. U.S. 176.6
6. AES Data Ltd. Can. 155.0
7. Sperry Rand Canada Ltd. U.S. 124.0
8. Philips Data Systems Ltd. Netherlands 100.3
9. Honeywell Ltd. U.S. 260.5b
10. Burroughs Business Machines Ltd. U.S. 105.0
b
11. Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd.c Can. 77.9
12. Datacrown Inc. Can. 68.6
13. Hewlett-Packard (Canada) Ltd. U.S. 99.4 b
14. Xerox of Canada Ltd. U.S. 484.2
15. Mitel Corp. Can. 43.4
16. Amdahl Ltd. U.S. 43.0
17. B.C. Systems Corp. Can. 40.2
18. Computel Systems Ltd.c Can. 38.1
19. I.P. Sharp Associates Ltd. Can. 35.5
20. MAI Canada Ltd. U.S. 35.0
21. Memorex Canada Ltd. U.S. 32.3
22. Storage Technology of Canada U.S. 28.8
23. Gandalf Data Communications Ltd. Can. 26.4
24. Canadian General Electric U.S. N/A
25. Olivetti Canada Ltd. Italy N/A
bEstimated by Evans Research Corporation
cThese companies merged in 1982
N/A Not Available
Source: Evans Research Corporation
Plante, Canada's Advanced Technology Industry, in FomIiG INVESTMENT REvIEw 6 (Spring
1982).
'61 For a summary of Canadian participation in international fora on TDF, see CAN. DEP'T
OF COMMUNICATIONS, ANNUAL REPORT (1982).
International attention has been recently focused on TDF; however, only two interna-
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agreements on TDF,152 the primary emphasis must necessarily be
bilateral with the United States. Numerous issues emerge between
the two countries due to the pervasive scope of their cultural, po-
litical, and economic interaction.1 53 Many of these issues can be
solved quickly, routinely, and amicably through the use of exten-
sive channels of communications which link almost all levels of the
two governments. 15 TDF, however, is an issue that is probably not
capable of resolution in the short term because it is germane to
sweeping fundamental changes in the economies of both countries
that will continue to manifest themselves for some time. Even if
not solvable in the short term, the issue of TDF does require im-
mediate attention in order to ameliorate its possible negative ef-
fects on Canadian-United States relations and economies and to
prevent reactive legislation which would distort the free flow of
data and its positive consequences for Canada and the United
States. Since 1980, periodic informal consultations have been un-
derway between Canadian and United States communications
officials. 155
In the long term, the free flow of information, much like free
trade, would probably benefit both countries.156 But in the interim,
the vast network of informal arrangements which typifies Cana-
dian-United States relations can be put to work resolving conflicts
as they arise.1 57 There will probably be an economic integration in
tional legal frameworks have emerged. See Organization For Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, supra note 105; Council of Europe: Convention for the Protection of Individuals
with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, supra note 105. The Canadian Dele-
gation to the OECD has been supportive of the United States initiatives pertaining to the
TDF legal issues in that forum. Coombe & Kirk, Privacy, Data Protection, and Transborder
Data Flow, 39 Bus. LAW. 33, 55 n.116 (1983).
16' See generally DEAN RUSK CENTER, COMPARATIVE FACTS ON CANADA, MEXICO AND THE
UNITED STATES: A FOUNDATION FOR SELECTIVE INTEGRATION AND TRILATERAL COOPERATION
29-61 (1979).
153 See id. at 44-55. See also SWANSON, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE CA-
NADA-U.S. RELATIONSHIP (1978).
' For an analysis of the development of free trade agreements between Canada and the
United States in the automative parts industry, see 1 A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH, & A.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 307-83 (1968).
" Unfortunately, the United States is poorly prepared to deal with the problems of TDF.
See Spero, Information: The Policy Void, 48 FOREIGN POL'Y 139 (1982).
'" For a discussion of the possibilities of economic integration, see generally DEAN RUSK
CENTER, supra note 152.
For current information on the activities of FIRA in high technology investments, see
FIRA, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW (Spring 1982).
151 DEAN RUSK CENTER, supra note 152, at 57. See generally CANADIAN PARLIAMENT
STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CANADA-U.S. RELATIONS, vols. I-IV
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the information industries of the two countries; therefore, it is in
Canada's interest to continue to target legislation and to use FIRA
to protect vulnerable sectors of the Canadian economy from
trauma during the transition.
After a de facto economic integration has taken place, a formal
Canadian-United States agreement could develop from stabilized
informal arrangements reflecting mutual benefit and a consensus
on TDF. The smoothness of this transition will depend on the con-
tinuing amicability of Canadian-United States relations. Recently,
however, internal cultural and political factors coupled with do-
mestic and international economic policies have eroded the foun-
dations of some mutual interests and caused the countries' respec-
tive policies to become more divergent. Thus, a smooth transition
will require United States negotiators to be aware of and sensitive
to genuine Canadian concerns over the use of TDF to facilitate
United States dominance in the information revolution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The information revolution, with its attendant increasing trans-
border data flow, is a two-edged sword. While holding out the
promise of a mutually beneficial interconnected world, TDF
threatens some of the basic notions about nation-states. TDF
makes present legal systems obsolete by raising issues that cut
across traditional institutional frameworks. Canada is actively try-
ing to construct a legal framework that recognizes these issues. But
as Canada moves toward a comprehensive informatics policy it
faces a Hobson's choice: unregulated TDF could pose a threat to
economic independence while overregulation could estrange Ca-
nada from current technologies and emerging potential world mar-
kets. As a result Canadian policy-makers have left the flow of data
more or less unchecked.
Canada can choose from a variety of domestic and foreign mod-
els to regulate TDF; however, the present developmental trend of a
Canadian legal framework for TDF either targets legislation at key
sectors such as banking or uses the FIRA. This trend may effec-
tively protect vulnerable sectors of Canadian industry and promote
the information industry, while causing few political repercussions
at home or abroad. In Canada's effort to promote interdependence
rather than dependence, stimulation of domestic research and de-
(1979).
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velopment and bilateral agreements on TDF may prove more fruit-
ful than domestic legislative impediments.
Douglas Yarn

